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COMMENT
WINNING AT ALL COSTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
A UNIVERSITY'S POTENTIAL LIABILITY
FOR SEXUAL ASSAULTS COMMITTED BY
ITS STUDENT ATHLETES
INTRODUCTION
On December 29, 2005, just four days before he was supposed to suit up
for the Florida State Seminoles in the FedEx Orange Bowl, senior linebacker
A.J. Nicholson sat in a Hollywood, Florida police station and was questioned
about allegedly sexually assaulting a nineteen-year-old woman. 1 On January
27, 2005, star University of Iowa basketball player Pierre Pierce threatened the
life of a former girlfriend, forcibly disrobed her, held her at knifepoint, and
vandalized her apartment.2 In February 2004, three Virginia Tech football
players, including quarterback Marcus Vick, were charged with at least ten
misdemeanors arising from an incident where they gave alcohol to three
fifteen-year-old girls, took pictures of them, and had sex with at least one of
the girls.3 Are all three of these sexually violent acts isolated incidents, or is
1. Florida State Linebacker Accused of Sexual Assault, ESPN.COM, Dec. 29, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=ncf&id=2274409.
2. Tom Witosky, Charges against Pierce upgraded; Former U of I Star Could Face Up to 56
years in Prison, DES MOINES REGISTER, Feb. 19, 2005, at lB. In 2002, Pierce had previously been
charged with third degree sexual assault for an attack on a female basketball player at the University
of Iowa; Pierce served one year probation and two hundred hours of community service and was
allowed to remain on the Iowa basketball team after the first assault. Id. In August 2005, Pierce pled
guilty to third-degree burglary, a felony, and assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, false
imprisonment and fourth-degree criminal mischief, all misdemeanors. Pierre Pierce Gets Two-Year
Sentence for Assault, ESPN.cOM, Oct. 28, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/
news/story?id=2206787. In October 2005, he was sentenced to a five-year suspended sentence on the
burglary charge, a two-year sentence on the assault charge, and one year each for false imprisonment
and criminal mischief. Those sentences are to be served concurrently. Id.
3. Welch Suggs, Brawls, Sex and Money: Another Routine Year in College Sports, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 17, 2004, at 43; Mark Berman, Vick Might Start Season On the Field, ROANOKE
TIMES & WORLD NEWS (Roanoke, Va.), June 29, 2004, at Cl. Vick and his two teammates were
found guilty during a jury trial in May 2004, but the verdict was eventually overturned on appeal and
all three men plead no contest to one misdemeanor count of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor. Shay Barnhart, Imoh Expected to Plead No Contest, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
there a nationwide epidemic of high profile male college athletes sexually
assaulting female students?
Statistics show that male athletes are more likely than the average male
college student to commit sexual assaults.4 According to one study, athletes
commit one in three college sexual assaults. 5 In another study of sexual
assaults at ten Division I schools between 1991 and 1993, male athletes made
up only 3.3% of the entire male college population but were involved in 19%
of the reported sexual assaults on campus. 6 Finally, a Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) report stated the rate of committing sexual assaults is
thirty-eight percent higher among college basketball and football players than
the average male college student.7
Furthermore, considering these staggering statistics, a university must be
aware of any potential liability that it could incur when a recruited male athlete
sexually assaults a female student on the university's campus. This is
particularly important considering that only thirty of the eighty-two Division I-
A schools have formal policies on how to handle athletes who are accused of
committing crimes, such as sexual assaults. 8
This comment will address the potential liability a university may face
under Title IX for recruiting athletes with violent criminal histories or keeping
athletes on campus after they commit criminally violent acts, specifically
(Roanoke, Va.), Sept. 15, 2004, at Cl. Vick was eventually kicked off the Virginia Tech football
team and suspended from the University for the fall semester before he pled guilty to the crimes
involving minor girls, when he pled guilty to reckless driving and possession of marijuana. Week in
Review, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS (Roanoke, Va.), Sept. 19, 2004, at NRV8. However,
Vick was reinstated on the Virginia Tech football team after he completed drug education counseling
and was allowed to re-enroll at Virginia Tech in January 2005; he was the team's starting quarterback
when the 2005-2006 season began on September 4 against North Carolina State. Erik Brady,
Prodigal Son Returns Home, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 2005, at IC. Vick was kicked off the Virginia
Tech football team for a second time in January 2006 for a laundry list of indiscretions including
intentionally stomping on the leg of an opponent during the Gator Bowl. Virginia Tech Kicks Marcus
Vick Off Football Team, ESPN.cOM, Jan. 7, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?
section=ncf&id=2283440.
4. Nat'l Coalition Against Violent Athletes, Prevention Programs, http://www.ncava.org/
prevention.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
5. Id.
6. William Nack & Lester Munson, Sports' Dirty Little Secret, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 31,
1995, at 62. See also Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against Women, 31
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 167, 169-70 (1998).
7. See, e.g., CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: THE
PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION 21 (1993). See also Thomas N. Sweeney, Comment, Closing the
Campus Gates - Keeping Criminals Away from the University - The Story of Student-Athlete
Violence and Avoiding Institutional Liability for the Good ofAll, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 226, 230
(1999).
8. Nat'l Coalition Against Violent Athletes, supra note 4.
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athletes who have been sexually violent towards female students. In order to
better understand if there would be any liability for a university, the following
areas will be examined: (1) the two sources of potential liability under Title
IX, (a) the Office of Civil Rights guidelines pertaining to sexual harassment
and (b) Title IX case law; (2) the most recent real life example of a Title IX
case based on sexual assaults by student-athletes; and (3) the information that
athletic departments need to know about sexual harassment after the most
recent court decision concerning Title IX and sexual harassment.
SOURCES OF TITLE IX INTERPRETATION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 was passed by Congress to
"protect[] people from discrimination based on sex in education programs or
activities which receive federal financial assistance." 9 Title IX applies to all
local and state agencies that receive federal funding from the Department of
Education, including "approximately 16,000 local school districts, 3,200
colleges and universities, and 5,000 for-profit schools .. ... 10 The statute,
which states that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance,"11 is enforced in part by a series of regulations
promulgated by the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") and in part by private
civil lawsuits filed by individuals. This section of the comment will discuss
the development of both of these avenues of enforcement.
Administrative Regulations from the Office for Civil Rights
The OCR, under the authority of the Department of Education, has the
primary responsibility of enforcing Title IX's prohibition on sex
discrimination within federally funded programs. 12 This is done principally
through the investigation and resolution of complaints alleging sex
discrimination. 13 However, the OCR also provides guidance to the large
number of federally funded entities subject to Title IX's regulations by
publishing and distributing information and guidances to help these entities
9. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX AND SEX DISCRIMINATION (1998),
available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tixdis.html.
10. Id.
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
12. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9.
13. Id.
2006]
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voluntarily comply with Title IX. 14
The OCR finds its power to promulgate regulations in § 1682 of the Act,
which allows any federal department or agency in charge of distributing
federal funds to create rules, provisions and guidelines for enforcing the
prohibitions on sex discrimination established by Title IX.15 As a result, the
OCR has created a number of guidelines for the enforcement of Title IX,
including guidelines in regard to intercollegiate athletics policy, equal
opportunity in intercollegiate athletics, teenage pregnancy issues, and sexual
harassment. 16 This comment will focus only on the application of the sexual
harassment guidelines established by the OCR as applied to harassment by
other students or third parties.
The most recent OCR guidelines concerning sexual harassment under
Title IX, the Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students
by School Employees, Other Students and Third Parties ("Guidance"), were
published in 2001.17 The Guidance includes a variety of standards and
definitions to help schools maintain voluntary compliance with Title IX's
prohibition on sexual harassment. 18
However, it should initially be noted that the OCR only has the ability to
withdraw federal funding from any institution that fails to comply with Title
IX's prohibitions on sex discrimination. 19 The OCR's main job is to ensure
that each federally funded institution has a procedure in place for handling
cases of sexual discrimination and that these procedures are fair and
effective. 20 What the OCR does not have is the power to award damages to
the individual victims of sex discrimination.21 If an individual victim wants
monetary compensation from the university, he or she must take private action
against that institution; this approach will discussed below.
14. Id.
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000).
16. U.S. Dep't of Educ. Office of Civil Rights, Reading Room, available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/ilist/ocr/publications.html#TitlelX (last visited December 25, 2005).
17. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD
PARTIES (2001), available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/shguide.pdf Prior to the
2001 publication of the Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, the OCR had published a set of
guidelines in 1997, which outlined many of the same principals. However, after the Supreme Court
issued several important decisions including Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 US. 274
(1998) and Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999), the OCR reissued the
Guidance and incorporated many of the key components of Gebser and Davis. Id. at i.
18. See generally id.
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Types of Sexual Harassment
The Guidance defines sexual harassment as "unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature." 22 There are two distinct forms of sexual harassment, quid pro
quo harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment. 23 Quid pro quo
harassment occurs when "a teacher or other employee conditions an
educational decision or benefit on the student's submission to unwelcome
sexual conduct." 24  In contrast, hostile environment sexual harassment is
defined as conduct that "does not explicitly or implicitly condition a decision
or benefit on submission to sexual conduct .... [and which,] requires a further
assessment of whether or not the conduct is sufficiently serious to deny or
limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program
based on sex." 25 Both types of sexual harassment are considered violations of
Title IX.26 Because of their position of power over students, teachers and
other school employees are able to engage in both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment. 27 However, because fellow students are
generally unable to condition educational benefits on submission to
unwelcome sexual advances, students can engage only in hostile environment
sexual harassment. 28 For that reason, this comment will primarily address
hostile environment sexual harassment.
An Individual School's Responsibilities Under Title IX
After defining the two distinct types of sexual harassment, the Guidance
goes on to address an individual school's responsibilities for maintaining
compliance with Title IX, including (1) whether the harassment is sufficiently
serious as to deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from
an educational program, (2) the nature of the school's responsibility to address
sexual harassment, (3) the notice that the school is required to have of the
harassment, and (4) the role of the school's grievance procedures in the
process. 29  An individual school's responsibilities under each of these
categories are the same for both quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile
environment sexual harassment, except that quid pro quo is assumed to be
22. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 2.
23. Id at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See generally id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See generally id.
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sufficiently serious so as to deny a student's ability to participate in an
educational program.30 Thus, this first step does not need to be addressed
when dealing with quid pro quo sexual harassment.31
Does the Harassment Deny or Limit a Student's Ability to Participate in or
Benefit from an Educational Program?
When determining if sexual harassment denies or limits a student's ability
to participate in or benefit from an educational program, the OCR requires two
things: (1) that the conduct be "sufficiently severe" and (2) that the conduct be
"unwelcome." 32 First, regarding conduct that is sufficiently severe to create a
hostile environment, the Guidance requires that the behavior in question be
examined from both a subjective and objective point of view, and that all
relevant circumstances be considered. 33 Factors that schools should consider
when determining the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct include: the
degree to which the conduct affected one or more students' education; the
type, frequency, and duration of the conduct; the identity of and relationship
between the alleged harasser and the subject of harassment; the number of
individuals involved; the age and sex of the alleged harasser and subject of
harassment; the size of the school, location of incidents, and context in which
they occurred; other incidents at the school; and incidents of gender-based, but
nonsexual harassment. 34 Specifically, looking at the "type, frequency and
duration of conduct" factor, a single act, such as a sexual assault, can create a
hostile environment even though it only occurred once because the single act
of sexually assaulting another student is so severe.35 However, if a male
student were to comment on a female student's physical appearance or ask her
for sexual favors, this behavior would probably not create a hostile
environment if it were an isolated incident, but it would create a hostile
environment if it were repeated behavior or done in a threatening or
intimidating manner. 36 The Guidance emphasizes that the totality of the
circumstances should always be considered, and school administrators should
use common sense when evaluating the severity of the conduct. 37
In addition to conduct that is sufficiently serious so as to create a hostile
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id.
32. See generally id. at 5-9.
33. Id. at 5.
34. Id. at 5-7.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 7.
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environment and deprive an individual of his or her education, the conduct
must also be unwelcome. The Guidance defines conduct as unwelcome "if the
student did not request or invite it and 'regarded the conduct as undesirable or
offensive."' 38 A lack of resistance to the conduct or failure to complain does
not necessarily mean that the conduct was welcome because the inaction may
have had valid motivations. 39 For example, a female student may be unwilling
to immediately report a sexual assault by a star athlete for a number of valid
reasons such as fear of retaliation from the alleged assaulter, fear of retaliation
from the athletic community, or shame because of the nature of the attack. In
addition, the fact that a student had willingly participated in the conduct on a
previous occasion does not mean that the student welcomed the conduct on
later occasions. 40
When there is an issue of whether the conduct was welcome or not, as
occurs in many college sexual assault cases, schools should consider the
following factors: statements by any witnesses of the alleged incident,
evidence about the relative credibility of the allegedly harassed student and the
alleged harasser, evidence that the alleged harasser has been found to have
harassed others, evidence of the allegedly harassed student's reaction or
behavior after the alleged harassment, evidence of whether the allegedly
harassed student filed a complaint or took other action to protest the conduct
soon after the alleged incident, and other contemporaneous evidence such as
the allegedly harassed student's diary or personal conversations with family or
friends.41
What is the Nature of School's Responsibility to Address Sexual Harassment?
After addressing what conduct qualifies as sexual harassment, the
Guidance turns its attention to the nature of the school's responsibility to
address sexual harassment and divides this area into two categories: (1)
harassment by teachers and other employees and (2) harassment by other
students or third parties. Since this comment addresses sexual assault by male
athletes of female students, only the standards for harassment by other
students or third parties will be addressed in depth.
When examining the responsibility of the school for peer-on-peer sexual
harassment, the school will only be held responsible
if a student sexually harasses another student and the harassing
38. Id. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted).
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 9.
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conduct is sufficiently serious to deny or limit the student's ability to
participate in or benefit from the program, and if the school knows or
reasonably should know about the harassment, [and] the school [fails
to take] immediate effective action to eliminate the hostile
environment and prevent its recurrence. 42
Thus, the school is not being held responsible for the harasser's actions,
but rather for its own reaction to knowledge of the harassment. By failing to
correct the harassment, the school can create a hostile environment for the
victim.43 As long as the school takes reasonable and prompt steps to stop the
sexual harassment that is causing the hostile environment as soon as the school
has actual or constructive notice of the harassment, then the school will not be
held responsible under the OCR guidelines. 44
How Much Knowledge Must the School Have of the Sexual Harassment?
Next, the Guidance addresses the notice that the school is required to have
of the sexual harassment in order to be held responsible under the OCR
guidelines. Specifically, "a school has notice if a responsible employee
'knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known,' about the
harassment. 4 5 Further, a responsible employee is "any employee who has the
authority to take action to redress the harassment, who has the duty to report to
appropriate school official sexual harassment or any other misconduct by
students or employees, or an individual who a student could reasonably
believe has this authority or responsibility. ' 46 Notice does not have to be
direct notice, such as a complaint by the affected student.47 Schools may
receive notice of sexual harassment in a variety of ways including personal
observation, notification by a concerned parent or teacher, rumors, or media
coverage. 48 The school is required to use "reasonably diligent inquiry" to
determine if there are any incidents of sexual harassment. 49 In addition, if a
school has actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment, it is required to
take appropriate action even if the affected student or students did not follow
the proper grievance procedures outlined by the school. 50
42. Id, at 12.
43. Id
44. Id.





50. Id. at 14.
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What is the Role of Schools' Grievance Procedures in the Process?
Finally, under the category of determining the school's responsibilities,
the Guidance addresses the role of an individual school's grievance procedure
in the resolution of sexual harassment cases.51  Specifically, all schools
receiving federal funds are required to create and distribute grievance
procedures that provide "for prompt and equitable resolution of sex
discrimination complaints, including complaints of sexual harassment" and to
create and distribute a policy against sexual discrimination. 52 A school is in
violation of Title IX simply by failing to adopt and publish a policy, even if
sexual harassment does not occur.53 These steps are required because without
a grievance policy in place and disseminated to students, victims of sexual
harassment do not know how to report and to whom to report.54 Furthermore,
these grievance procedures create a system where responsible employees
receive notification of any potential sexual harassment as soon as possible,
thus preventing the school from claiming that it had no actual or constructive
notice of the alleged sexual harassment.55 On the flipside, schools cannot
claim that they had no knowledge of the harassment if they did not have a
grievance procedure in place that would have provided that notification. 56
An Individual School's Response to Sexual Harassment
After outlining the school's responsibilities to determine if conduct
qualifies as sexual harassment, the Guidance then addresses the school's
response to discovering that sexual harassment has occurred. 57 The school
must "take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate ... [as well as] take
prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment,
eliminate a hostile environment ... and prevent harassment from occurring
again." 58 Furthermore, what is considered a reasonable response depends on
the circumstances of each individual case of alleged sexual harassment.59
In the case of sexual assaults by male athletes on female students at
universities, the most realistic type of notification of this behavior is via an
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id. at 14.
55. Id.
56. Id.




MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
individual student or parent reporting the assault rather than through personal
observation by a school official. However, regardless of the type of
notification, the school must promptly, thoroughly, and impartially investigate
the allegations, taking into consideration the following factors: "the nature of
the allegations, the source of the complaint, the age of the student or students
involved, [and] the size and administrative structure of the school[.] '60
Once the school has determined that sexual harassment has occurred,61 it
must take steps that are "reasonable, timely, age-appropriate, and effective"
and are "tailored to the specific situation." 62 The response to each situation
will be different based on its specific facts, and things that should be
considered include disciplinary steps against the harasser, separation of the
harasser and the harassed, special training about sexual harassment to repair
the educational environment, and new policy statements about sexual
harassment. 63 When determining the proper response to any act of sexual
harassment, the school must also take into consideration whether the student
who reported the harassment wishes to remain anonymous.64 The student who
reports sexual harassment may want to keep her name confidential for a
number of reasons, including prevention of future retaliatory actions against
her.65 However, a student who wishes to keep her identity secret should be
informed that this might limit the school's response to the sexual harassment.
The student should also be told that since Title IX prohibits retaliatory
conduct, the school is able to take steps to prevent retaliation and take strong
responsive steps if retaliation occurs.66
Thus, looking at the definitions of sexual harassment and the standards
established in the Guidance for holding a school responsible for the sexual
harassment of another student, an individual, such as a female student who is
sexually assaulted by a male student-athlete, would have to prove three things
to succeed in holding a school accountable for sexual harassment under Title
IX. First, the harassed student must prove that the male athlete's sexual
assault of her created a hostile environment because the sexual assault was
both unwelcome and "sufficiently severe" so as to impede her ability to enjoy
60. Id. These factors are not exclusive.
61. Prior to determining that sexual harassment has occurred, it may still be appropriate for the
school to take interim actions while investigating the complaint. For example, if one student sexually
assaults another student, it may be appropriate to house the students in separate dormitories
immediately, even before the investigation is complete. Id. at 16.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 16-17.
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any educational benefits. Second, the harassed student must prove that the
school knew or should have known about her sexual assault. Third, the
harassed student must prove that the school failed to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action after she was sexually assaulted.
Furthermore, once all of these things have been proven during an OCR
investigation arising from the individual harassed student's complaint, it is the
OCR's policy to offer the university an opportunity to voluntarily remedy the
situation by disciplining the student-athlete in question prior to the OCR
disciplining the school. 67 This is because Title IX's primary purpose is to
ensure that all institutions that receive federal funding are environments that
are free of sexual discrimination. 68 The purpose is not to punish these
institutions by taking away their federal fudning without providing an
opportunity to remedy the situation via the creation of an appropriate sexual
harassment policy that includes a grievance process. 69
Thus, while the OCR is willing to hold a university responsible for its
inaction in discovering and remedying any alleged sexual assaults by male
athletes upon female students, there will be no financial rewards to the victims
of these sexual assaults. Instead, the OCR will only force an offending school
to create a more viable process for handling future sexual assaults and
harassment on campus.
TITLE IX CASE LAW AND A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
In addition to establishing a system for the promulgation of guidelines for
handling sexual discrimination, Title IX has also been interpreted by courts to
create a private right of action for monetary damages for individuals who have
been sexually harassed by either a teacher or another student. This private
right of action is separate and distinct from the grievance process available
through the OCR; however, similar tests and terms are used in both. There are
four United States Supreme Court cases that create and clarify the standards
for an individual's private right of action against a federally funded institution
that is in violation of Title IX: Cannon v. University of Chicago,70 Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 71 Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District,72 and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.73
67. Id. at iii-iv.
68. Id. at iv.
69. Id.
70. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
71. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
72. 524 U.S. 274.
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Initially, in Cannon, the Supreme Court held that an individual plaintiff
had the ability to enforce Title [X's prohibition on intentional discrimination
by filing a civil suit against an offending institution. 74 In Cannon, the plaintiff
alleged that she was denied admission to medical school because of her
gender.75 At the time that she applied for admission to medical school, the
University of Chicago had a policy of not admitting any individuals over the
age of thirty unless the individual had an advanced degree.76 The plaintiff, a
thirty-nine year old woman, argued that the age and advanced degree policy
disproportionately affected women because "the incidence of interrupted
higher education is higher among women then men . . . [thus,] exclud[ing]
women from consideration even though the criteria was not valid predicators
of success in medical schools. . . ."77 As a defense, the University of Chicago
alleged that Title IX did not apply because there was no private right of action
provided under the federal statute.78
The Supreme Court held that although the statute did not explicitly
provide a private right of action,79 there is a right of action under Title IX as
long as a plaintiff could show that (1) that she was discriminated against
because of her gender and (2) the organization that is discriminating receives
federal financial assistance. 80 The Court reasoned that when Congress passed
Title IX in 1972, it was modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 81 which had already been interpreted to allow a similar private right of
action.82  Thus, the Court held that a woman who was intentionally
discriminated against because of her gender can privately bring a cause of
action against a federally funded institution to force that institution to comply
with Title IX.
Once a private right of action was established in Cannon, the Court further
clarified the issue by addressing whether an individual could recover
73. 526 U.S. 629.
74. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 680 n.2.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 688.
79. According to the federal statute, "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
80. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000). "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
82. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-97.
[Vol. 16:2
WINNING A TALL COSTS
compensatory damages for violations of Title IX. 83 In Franklin, a female high
school student filed a Title IX action against the school district, alleging that
her teacher and sports coach, Andrew Hill, had continually subjected her to
sexual harassment and abuse. 84 The plaintiff was a high school sophomore
when Hill began having conversations with her that were sexually oriented,
including asking her about "sexual experiences with her boyfriend and
whether she [ever] consider[ed] having sexual [relations] with an older
man."' 85 During the plaintiffs junior year, Hill had her excused from class
three times in order to coerce her into having sexual intercourse in his private
office. 86 The plaintiff argued that the school district was aware of this sexual
harassment because the school had investigated allegations of sexual
harassment by Hill against the plaintiff and other female students. 87
Allegedly, the school took no action to stop the harassment and even
discouraged the plaintiff from pressing charges against Hill.88 Hill eventually
resigned on the condition that all pending matters against him be dropped, and
the school closed its investigation. 89
Nonetheless, the plaintiff filed a Title IX lawsuit against the school
district, asking the court for compensatory damages.90 The school district
argued that since Congress had not expressly allowed for such damages in the
statutory structure of Title IX, these damages were impermissible. 9' The
Court held that even though Congress did not expressly state the ability to
collect monetary damages within the text of Title IX, such a right does exist.92
Relying primarily on precedent from Bell v. Hood93 and Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 94 the Court held that "[w]here legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done." 95  Furthermore, the court reasoned that a right without a
corresponding remedy would amount to a "monstrous absurdity in a well
83. Franklin, 503 U.S. 60.
84. Id. at 63.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 64.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 62.
91. See id. at 68.
92. Id. at 66.
93. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
94. 37 U.S. 524 (1838).
95. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 684).
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organized government. 96 Thus, the Court held that individuals who had been
discriminated against because of their gender could not only bring a private
right of action against the federally funded institution, but those individuals
could also seek monetary damages for intentional violations of Title IX's
prohibition on sexual discrimination. 97
The next case that the Court dealt with concerning Title IX, Gebser,
addressed what standard should be applied in determining whether an
individual school could also be held liable for sexual harassment. 98 The Court
specifically held that a school could not be liable for sexual harassment of a
student by a teacher "unless an official of the school district who at a
minimum ha[d] authority to institute corrective measures . . .ha[d] actual
notice of, and [was] deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct."99
The plaintiff, an underage high school student, had an ongoing sexual
relationship with her English teacher that began after her teacher made
suggestive sexual comments during class, kissed her, and fondled her. 100 The
relationship continued during the summer after her freshman year and
throughout her sophomore year of high school.'10 The plaintiff never reported
the relationship to school officials, who did not learn about it until a police
officer discovered the student and teacher engaged in sexual intercourse and
thus arrested the teacher. 10 2 The school district did not have an official
grievance procedure for handling sexual harassment claims but immediately
fired the teacher and the state revoked his teaching license. 10 3 The plaintiff
and her mother then sued the school district and the teacher under Title IX and
a variety of state laws. 10 4
The plaintiff urged the Court to adopt one of two standards of liability that
would hold the school district responsible for the teacher's sexual harassment:
respondeat superior liability or constructive notice liability. 10 5 Respondeat
superior liability would hold the school district liable in damages under Title
IX where a teacher is "'aided in carrying out the sexual harassment of students
by his or her position of authority with the institution,"' irrespective of
96. Id. at 67 (quoting Kendall, 37 U.S. at 624).
97. Id. at 76.
98. 524 U.S. 274.
99. Id. at 277.
100. Id. at 277-78.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 278.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 278-79.
105. Id. at 282.
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whether the school district officials had any knowledge of the harassment and
irrespective of their response upon becoming aware. 106
This theory of liability was lifted directly from the 1997 Policy Guidance,
which was later updated by the 2001 Policy Guidance, which is referred to
extensively above. 107 This theory would allow a victim to recover from the
school district whenever the teacher used his or her position of authority to
facilitate the harassment. 10 8
In the alternative, the plaintiff argued that the theory of constructive notice
liability should apply. 10 9 Under this theory of liability, the school district
would be liable for sexual harassment of a student when the school district
knew or should have known about the harassment. 110 This theory of liability
was again taken from the OCR Policy Guidance. "'1
The Court refused to hold the school district liable for any sexual
harassment of which the district did not have actual knowledge. 112 The Court
reasoned that the private right of action under Title IX was judicially implied
rather than an express right of action, and thus, the Court had more latitude in
shaping the remedial scheme to make it in sync with the statute. 113 The Court
further held that allowing an individual victim to collect monetary damages for
sexual harassment that the school district did not know about, and did not have
an opportunity to correct, would "'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX."" 14 The
Court reasoned that since the administrative agencies that enforce Title IX
require that there be notice and an opportunity to voluntarily correct the
discrimination prior to starting enforcement proceedings, the judicially created
cause of action could not reasonably require a more stringent standard.' '1
Thus, the Court held that a school district could be held liable only for
"deliberate indifference to discrimination" because a lower liability standard,
such as respondeat superior, would create a situation where the school was
liable not for its own independent decisions but rather for the independent





110. Id. at 282.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 284.
114. Id. at 285.
115. Id. at 288.
116. Id. at 290-91.
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for sexual harassment and be exposed to monetary damages under Title IX
when (1) a person with authoritative power (2) has actual knowledge of sexual
harassment, and (3) fails to act to stop the discrimination in such manner as to
be described deliberate indifference. 117 Thus, the standard for a private right
to action is higher than the standard outlined for administrative relief through
the OCR.
After determining the standard of liability for schools violating Title IX in
the context of teacher-on-student sexual harassment, the Court addressed the
standard of liability for a school if student-on-student sexual harassment
occurs in violation of Title IX. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education,118 the Court held that schools could be held liable only for its
institutional response to student-on-student sexual harassment and not for the
direct act of student-on-student sexual harassment.' l 9  Using the same
standard outlined above in Gebser, the Court held that when an institution is
deliberately indifferent to a student's complaints of sexual harassment
committed by another student, the school district risks depriving the victim of
the educational opportunities of the institution, and thus could violate Title
IX's prohibitions on sex discrimination. 120
The plaintiff in Davis, a female fifth grade student, was the alleged victim
of a long pattern of sexual harassment by a fellow fifth grade student.121 The
sexual harassment included attempts to touch her breasts and genital areas, as
well as inappropriate statements directed at the plaintiff such as "I want to get
in bed with you" and "I want to feel your boobs." 122 The plaintiff told her
mother and teacher about these incidents and was assured by her teacher that
the principal had been notified of her classmate's behavior. 123 However, the
school took no disciplinary action against the offending student, and his
pattern of behavior continued for several months, during which time several
other teachers witnessed or were informed of his offensive behavior. 124 The
sexual harassment stopped only after the offending student pled guilty to
sexual battery for his inappropriate behavior; no disciplinary action was ever
taken against the student by the school.125
117. Id. at 277.
118. 526 U.S. 629.
119. Id. at 652.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 633.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 633-34.
124. Id. at 634.
125. Id. at 634-35.
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The plaintiff filed a Title IX lawsuit against the school board alleging that
the persistent sexual advances and harassment by the student ...
interfered with [the plaintiff's] ability to attend school and perform her
studies and activities ... [and] the deliberate indifference by [the
school administrators] to the unwelcome sexual advances ... created
an intimidating, hostile, offensive and abusive school environment in
violation of Title IX.126
In an en banc decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit originally held that the petitioner failed to state a cause of
action for monetary and injunctive relief against respondent school district
because "student-on-student," or peer, harassment provided no grounds for a
private cause of action under Title IX .127
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held that, while peer sexual
harassment was less likely to violate Title IX guarantees than teacher-student
sexual harassment, 128 it is still a violation of Title IX's promise of equal
access if the school's response or its lack of response to the sexual harassment
is "deliberately indifferent" and therefore, clearly unreasonable given the
allegations of pervasive and continued sexual harassment. 129 Furthermore, in
order for the school to be held liable under Title IX, the harassment must be
"so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies its victims the
equal access to education that Title IX is designed to protect."' 130 Thus,
schools will only be held liable for peer-on-peer sexual harassment in extreme
cases where the harassment is severe, the school has actual knowledge of the
harassment, and the school's response is indifferent to the point that it deprives
female students the opportunity to participate in and receive the full benefits of
an educational system.
Thus, according to these four Supreme Court cases, colleges can only be
held liable for two different types of hostile environment sexual harassment:
teacher-on-student sexual harassment and student-on-student sexual
harassment. However, to be held liable and be susceptible to possible
monetary damages, colleges must (1) have actual knowledge of the sexual
harassment and (2) remain "deliberately indifferent" to the sexual harassment.
These requirements must be met for either teacher-on-student or student-on-
student sexual harassment before a college can be held liable. Finally, the
126. Id. at 636 (citations omitted).
127. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 526 U.S. 629.
128. Davis, 526 U.S. at 653.
129. Id. at 648.
130. Id. at 652.
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major differences between the OCR regulations and the private right of action
is that under the private right of action the school must have actual knowledge
of the alleged sexual harassment rather than actual or constructive knowledge.
Looking specifically at student-on-student sexual harassment, a college
can only be held liable for its reaction to a student-athlete's sexual assault of a
female student and only if that reaction is deliberately indifferent. For
example, if a recruited male football player sexually assaults a female student
while both are attending an on-campus party, the college cannot be held liable
for the individual football player's actions because the school had no control
over the player's action. However, the school could be held liable for its own
reaction to the sexual assault if that reaction is found to be deliberately
indifferent. In order to better understand how the courts have started to
interpret this standard in the context of college athletics, the district court's
decision from Simpson v. University of Colorado131 will be examined below.
REAL LIFE APPLICATION OF TITLE IX LIABILITY TO SEXUAL ASSAULTS: THE
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SEX SCANDAL
In order to better demonstrate how courts have applied the concept of Title
IX liability to universities for violent sexual assaults by student-athletes on
college campuses, the civil lawsuit arising from the highly publicized alleged
sexual improprieties of the University of Colorado's football team will be
examined.1 32 Because there is no published OCR investigation concerning the
liability of the University of Colorado under the guidelines, that analysis will
be hypothetical. However, since two female students1 33 did file a Title IX
action against the University of Colorado ("Colorado") in early 2004 claiming
that the university deprived them of an equal education by allowing a pattern
of sexual harassment to go unchecked within the football-recruiting program,
the District Court for the District of Colorado's decision in Simpson v.
University of Colorado134 will be examined in depth concerning the private
right of action. 1
35
131. 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Colo. 2005).
132. See e.g., Jim Hughes, Accuser Says CU Retaliating for Suit Misstatements Cited; Lisa
Simpson Seeks to Amend Her Lawsuit Alleging Rape at a Party Attended by Football Players; CU
Officials Deny Acting Improperly, DENY. POST, Sept. 15, 2004, at B3.
133. A third student, ex-University of Colorado soccer player Monique Gillaspie, had originally
been part of this suit against the university, but she dropped the case in December 2004 after what she
described at legal 'guerilla warfare' was employed against her by the university. Ex-Soccer Player
Fed Up with Legal 'Guerrilla Warfare, Dec. 13, 2004, ESPN.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id= 1945583.
134. 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229.
135. Id. at 1231-32.
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University of Colorado Football Recruiting Sex Scandal and the OCR
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment
Following the structure laid out in by the 2001 OCR Guidance, the
following issues need to be addressed in relation to the allegations of sexual
harassment at the University of Colorado: (1) what type of sexual harassment
is at issue; (2) what was the university's responsibility concerning sexual
harassment on its campus; and (3) what was the university's response to the
allegations of sexual harassment. More specifically, within the issue of the
university's responsibilities under Title IX, the following questions need to be
answered: (1) does the harassment limit the student's ability to benefit from an
educational program; (2) what is the nature of school's responsibility to
address the harassment; (3) what knowledge did the school have of the sexual
harassment; and (4) what role did the school's grievance procedure play.
Types of Sexual Harassment
Looking at the two types of defined sexual harassment established by the
Guidance, the behavior that the female students at Colorado are alleging is
clearly hostile environment sexual harassment. The two female students
alleged that several Colorado football players and recruits sexually assaulted
them while attending a party at Ms. Simpson's apartment in December
2001.136 According to Ms. Simpson - one of the female students who was
sexually assaulted - towards the end of the evening, she felt intoxicated and
tired, so she went into her bedroom to lie down.' 37 Shortly thereafter, two
football players and two football recruits went into Ms. Simpson's room and
disrobed her while she was passed out on her bed.138 The recruits then
sexually assaulted Ms. Simpson as the two players stood by and watched. 139
Afterward, additional Colorado football players demanded sexual favors of
Ms. Simpson who attempted to resist but was unable to "because she was
terrified and surrounded by at least five large football players and recruits."' 140
At the same time that Ms. Simpson was being sexually assaulted, Ms.
Gilmore, the other complainant in this case, was being sexually assaulted in
the same room by at least three other men who were either Colorado football
players or football recruits. 141 This behavior is hostile environment sexual
136. Id.
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harassment because students or third parties committed it and because an
educational benefit was not contingent on submission to the sexual
harassment. 142
The University's Responsibilities Under Title IX
After determining that the alleged conduct should be analyzed as hostile
environment sexual harassment, the OCR would then determine the severity of
the harassment, the university's responsibilities under Title IX to address the
harassment, the university's knowledge of the harassment, and the role the
university's grievance procedure played in handling the sexual harassment
allegations.
Limitations on Educational Benefits
First, the OCR would examine the nature of the sexual harassment and
determine if it is sufficiently serious so as to deny or limit the student's ability
to participate in or benefit from the program. Using all the factors laid out in
the Guidance, the OCR would probably find that the behavior is sufficiently
serious. This is because while the conduct only occurred one time, a sexual
assault is the most serious type of sexual discrimination that can create a
hostile environment. 143
In addition to being sufficiently severe, the OCR must determine if the
conduct limits or denies the complaining students' ability to receive an
education. 144 An individual can be detrimentally affected by the sexual
harassment in a variety of ways including lower grades, physical or emotional
distress, or forced withdrawal from school. 145 In this case, Ms. Simpson did
withdraw from Colorado after being sexually assaulted and Ms. Gilmore, who
remained a Colorado student, suffered emotional damage because she was
forced to attend school with individuals who had sexually assaulted her. 146
Based on the criteria outlined in the Guidance, these injuries are the type of
injuries that illustrate that Ms. Simpson and Ms. Gilmore were unable to enjoy
the benefits of the university's educational program because of the sexual
harassment.
Finally, the OCR must also determine if the behavior was unwelcome. 147
142. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 5.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.
147. U.S. DEP'TOF EDUC.,supra note 17, at 7.
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Based on Ms. Simpson's and Ms. Gilmore's statements that several large men
forcibly disrobed them while they were too intoxicated to protest, 148 it appears
that this behavior was unwelcome. However, before completing its
investigation, the OCR would have to further investigate this issue to
determine if the conduct was actually unwelcome. The OCR would
investigate by examining the circumstances surrounding the alleged sexual
assault including the victims' reactions, statements by any witnesses, and any
other contemporaneous evidence such as a letter or diary entry by the
victim. 149 In this case, one of the victims, Ms. Simpson, did keep a diary on a
regular basis.150 Thus, the examination of her entries immediately following
the alleged sexual assault could be extremely helpful in determining the
validity of her claims.
The OCR, after examining all the facts, would probably find that the
sexually harassing conduct alleged in this case would be sufficiently serious
and unwelcome so as to deny or limit the student's ability to participate in or
benefit from the program.
Nature of University's Responsibility to Address the Sexual Harassment
In this case, because the sexual harassment is hostile environment sexual
harassment rather than quid pro quo, the university can only be held
responsible for its reaction after learning about the sexual harassment. The
university cannot be held liable for the direct actions of the football players or
recruits because it had no control over their actions. The entirety of the
school's responsibility is to make sure that it takes "corrective actions to stop
the sexual harassment, prevent its recurrence, and remedy the effects on the
victim that could reasonably have been prevented had the school responded
promptly and effectively." 151
University's Knowledge of the Sexual Harassment
According to the OCR guidelines, a school will be responsible for
violating Title IX's prohibition on sexual discrimination if the school knew or
should have known about a hostile environment on campus. 152 In this case,
148. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
149. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 9.
150. Simpson v. Univ. of Colorado, 220 F.R.D. 354 (D. Colo. 2004) (holding that the University
of Colorado could compel Ms. Simpson to turn over portions of her diary as part of the discovery for
a Title IX claim of sexual harassment against the school).
151. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 13.
152. Id. at 13.
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the plaintiffs provided a list of seven incidents that allegedly provided notice
to the school concerning an environment of sexual harassment in the school's
football recruiting programs: (1) a 1997 sexual assault of high school girls
attending an off-campus party hosted by football players and recruits; (2) Head
Football Coach Gary Bamett's arrival on campus and notification of the
previous sexual assaults; (3) three separate incidents of football players and
coaches pleading guilty to assaults against women; (4) a 1999 recruit who told
Barnett that he would not attend the university because of improprieties during
his recruiting visit; (5) Katharine Hnida's allegations of sexual harassment and
sexual assault by her former football teammates; (6) a 2001 sexual assault of a
student trainer by a football player; and (7) prior sexual assault claims against
two player-hosts who were at Ms. Simpson's apartment with recruits on the
night she was sexually assaulted.' 53
Under the standard of actual or constructive notice, it is possible that the
OCR could have examined this extensive list of sexual indiscretions and held
that the university should have investigated the situation further to determine if
there was a pattern of sexual harassment and sexual assault within the football
recruiting program.
The University's Grievance Procedure
In order to be in compliance with Title IX, Colorado must have in place a
procedure for dealing with all sexual harassment claims, and this procedure
must be publicized to the students. In March 2004, the Chancellor at the
University of Colorado commissioned an investigation of Colorado's
"policies, practices, and protocols related to responding to incidents of sexual
harassment and sexual misconduct."' 154 While this report was completed after
Ms. Simpson's and Ms. Gilmore's December 2001 sexual assaults, it is still
helpful because it provides a detailed analysis of Colorado's current and
previous administrative response to sexual harassment. 155
Specifically, the report outlines the type of conduct that would qualify as
sexual harassment under the Student Code of Conduct. 156 This prohibited
conduct includes both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual
harassment. 157 In addition to listing the school's three Title IX compliance
officers along with their specific duties, the report also lists the offices on
153. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1237-40.
154. UNIV. OF COLO., REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT / SEXUAL MISCONDUCT RESPONSE
(2004), available at http://www.colorado.edu/chancellor/reports/sexual-misconduct/.
155. Id.
156. See generally id.
157. Id.
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campus with the responsibility of disseminating and enforcing the sexual
harassment policy. 158  These offices and resources include the Sexual
Misconduct Case Management Team, which coordinates investigation and
adjudication procedures if sexual harassment is alleged, and the Student
Outreach program, which educates students on sexual harassment. 159
Based on everything that is outlined in this report, the OCR will probably
find that Colorado had in place a grievance procedure for sexual harassment
that complied with Title IX. However, this does not mean that Colorado will
automatically be in compliance with Title IX because it has a grievance
procedure. Colorado can still be in violation of Title IX if it failed to utilize its
grievance procedure; this question will be addressed in the next subsection.
The University's Response to the Sexual Harassment
After examining all of Colorado's responsibilities under Title IX and
determining that the university had appropriate knowledge of the alleged risk
of sexual harassment arising from the university's football recruiting system,
the OCR would then examine Colorado's response to the sexual harassment to
determine if it is responsible for violating Title IX. Specifically, the OCR
would look at the university's initial investigative steps and at how the
university disciplined those involved in the sexual harassment. The standard
that the OCR would use to determine if Colorado violated Title IX is whether
Colorado "t[ook] immediate and appropriate steps to investigate ... [as well
as] t[ook] prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end any
harassment, eliminate a hostile environment.., and prevent harassment from
occurring again." 160
In this case, the complaining students are alleging that Colorado failed to
properly discipline and curtail previous acts of sexual harassment, thus
creating a hostile environment that ultimately resulted in their sexual
assaults. 161 The women are not alleging that the school failed to properly react
to their complaints of sexual assault, but they are alleging that the football
team used a pattern of "sex and alcohol ... as recruiting tools in the football
recruiting program."' 162 Because of these allegations, the OCR would
investigate whether Colorado properly investigated and disciplined all
previous allegations of sexual harassment to determine whether Colorado
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 15.
161. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
162. Id. at 1232-33.
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created a hostile environment.
Specifically looking at each of the seven listed incidents by the
complaining students, the OCR would analyze Colorado's response to each
incident to determine if it was reasonable under all circumstances. For
example, in the first cited incident, a 1997 sexual assault of a high school
student by a football recruit, the school responded by instituting a zero-
tolerance policy for the use of alcohol and sex as recruiting tools at both on-
and off-campus parties.1631n another cited incident, Colorado hired a football
coach who had been convicted of assaulting his wife and kept a player who
had also been convicted of assaulting his wife on the team; after learning about
these convictions, Colorado did nothing to dismiss these individuals for the
football team. 164 Next, concerning Katharine Hnida's allegations that her
teammates routinely sexually harassed her while she played for Colorado, it
appears that Coach Barnett took no formal steps to discipline any students
through Colorado's formal Title IX grievance policy. 165 Finally, concerning a
sexual assault of a female student trainer by a football player, a football
department official obtained assistance for the female trainer by arranging a
meeting for the student with Coach Barnett and other officials in the football
program. 166 However, after meeting with Coach Barnett, the female student
"felt that Barnett had intimidated her into not pressing criminal charges against
the football player."' 167
Based on this information, the OCR could reasonably find that if Colorado
had actual or constructive knowledge in all of the above listed incidents, then
Colorado did not take immediate, appropriate, and effective steps to deal with
the allegations of sexual harassment. This standard, which is not the same as
the "deliberate indifference" standard that will be discussed below, does not
require the school to take specifically defined steps to end the harassment. 168
This standard only requires that the school act promptly and impartially both
during the investigation and during the disciplinary process. 169
Conclusion of OCR Investigation
Thus, by failing to further investigate and further discipline the individuals
163. Id. at 1237-38.
164. Id. at 1238-39.
165. Id. at 1239-40.
166. Id. at 1240.
167. Id.
168. U.S. DEP'T OFEDUC.,supra note 17, at 15-17.
169. Id. at 15-16.
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involved in these alleged indiscretions, OCR could find that the University of
Colorado failed to abide by Title IX. However, even if the OCR found the
university liable, it would not impose damages for the individual victims;
instead, it would only require that the university take appropriate corrective
actions to remedy the problem. Appropriate actions could include suspending
or expelling the players who committed sexually violent acts against female
students, suspending or firing the coaches and administrators who were given
the task of supervising the recruiting process or requiring the university to
create and enforce a more restrictive and better supervised football recruitment
program. What is important to note is that even if the university was found to
be in violation of Title IX, it would not be liable to any of the victims for
damages and would only risk the possibility of losing federal funding if it
refused to remedy the hostile environment within the football recruiting
program.
University of Colorado Football Recruiting Sex Scandal and the Private Right
to Action Under Title IX
Turning now to the actual civil court decision in Simpson, the civil case
against Colorado never survived the university's summary judgment motion
because the plaintiffs were unable to prove each of the five elements that the
court outlined:
(1) that the University had actual knowledge of sexual harassment of
female CU students by football players and recruits as a part of the
football recruiting program[ 170]; (2) that the University was
deliberately indifferent to this known sexual harassment ... (3) that
the plaintiffs were subjected to severe, pervasive and objectively
offensive sexual harassment caused by the University's deliberate
indifference to known sexual harassment; (4) that the harassment
occurred in the context of an educational activity; and (5) that the
harassment had the systemic effect of depriving plaintiffis] of access
to educational benefits or opportunities.] 7
The differences between this test and the three-element test outlined by the
Guidance172 are that the Simpson court (1) included the legal concept of
170. The pattern of sexual harassment in this case is specifically limited to the action that
occurred during the University's recruitment of future players because both plaintiffs in this case
allege that they were raped by football players and football recruits during official recruiting visits.
Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-32..
171. Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).
172. The Guidance requires that the harassed student must prove (1) the sexual harassment
created a hostile environment because the conduct was both unwelcome and "sufficiently severe" so
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"deliberate indifference," which was derived from Davis, (2) required that
actual knowledge of the harassment be demonstrated according to Davis, (3)
required that the sexual harassment be in the context of an educational activity,
and (4) divided the OCR's requirement of "sufficiently severe" sexual
harassment that impedes a victim's ability to enjoy educational benefits into
two separate steps. Some of these differences are merely cosmetic and do not
affect the analysis under the test. However, the added requirement of actual
knowledge and the use of the legal term "deliberate indifference" had a
significant impact on how this court chose to analyze the facts as opposed to
how the OCR would have analyzed the facts. It is important to keep these
differences in mind when examining the court's analysis of the facts because it
can be helpful to explain any possible differences in decisions between the
court and the hypothetical OCR investigation.
Turning to the substance of the Simpson decision, as mentioned above in
Gebser and Davis, in order for a school to be held liable for the sexual
harassment of another student, "an official of the school . .. who at a
minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the [school's]
behalf ' 173 must have actual notice of the harassment. 174  Thus, before the
court could determine if the University had actual knowledge, it had to
determine which officials in the university had "authority to institute
corrective measures" over the football program. 175 If these school officials
had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment, then the University could be
held liable for the harassment. 176 After examining the power structure within
the University, the court held that Head Football Coach Gary Barnett, Athletic
Director Richard Tharp, and University Chancellor Richard Byyny "generally
had control over the rules established for the football program, and control
over the enforcement of those rules within the football program."'177 With this
established, the court then determined the scope of the sexual harassment that
the individuals were required to have actual knowledge of to be held liable
under Title IX. 178 The court held the scope of the harassment to be the
potential risk that "football players and recruits would sexually assault female
University students as part of the recruiting program ... [and] the risk of those
as to impede her ability to enjoy any educational benefits; (2) the school knew or should have known
about the sexual harassment; and (3) the school failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action after she was sexually assaulted. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17.
173. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
174. Id.
175. Simpson 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1235.
178. Id. at 1235-36.
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assaults would be aided or exacerbated by excessive alcohol use by players,
recruits, and female students."' 179 Thus, the University could only be liable
under Title IX if the above named administrators had actual knowledge of the
specific potential risk for sexual harassment.
Next, the court examined the list of events cited by the plaintiffs that
allegedly illustrated a pattern of sexual harassment to determine whether (1)
these previous events were within the scope of the alleged sexual harassment
so as to provide notice of future events, and (2) whether these previous events
were even known to the appropriate administrative authorities. 80 The events
cited by the plaintiffs that allegedly provided notice to the University included:
(1) a 1997 sexual assault of high school girls attending an off-campus party
hosted by football players and recruits; (2) Barnett's arrival on campus and
notification of the previous sexual assaults; (3) three separate incidents of
football players and coaches pleading guilty to assaults against women; (4) a
1999 recruit who told Barnett that he would not attend the university because
of improprieties during his recruiting visit; (5) Katharine Hnida's allegations
of sexual harassment and sexual assault by her former football teammates; (6)
a 2001 sexual assault of a student trainer by a football player; and (7) prior
sexual assault claims against two player-hosts who were at Simpson's
apartment with recruits on the night she was sexually assaulted. 181
Based on these events, the court held that there was no actual knowledge
of a pattern of sexual harassment because the prior events, while all involving
violent acts against women, did not involve the narrowly drawn risk and
specific threat of sexual assaults by football players and recruits during formal
recruiting weekends and with the assistance of both alcohol and other female
students. 182 Thus, the University did not have actual knowledge of a pattern
of sexual harassment, and therefore, the first element of the five-part test was
not met. 183
After deciding that Colorado could not be held liable for violating Title IX
because it did not have actual knowledge of any risk of sexual harassment, the
court continued its discussion of the remaining four elements of its test.
Concerning the second element of "deliberate indifference," the court held that
Colorado had not been deliberately indifferent to any previous or current
allegations of sexual assaults committed by its football players or recruits. 184
179. Id. at 1237.
180. Id. at 1237-40.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1241-42.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1242-45.
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The court reasoned that deliberate indifference was such a high standard that it
was essentially equivalent to an intentional violation of Title IX. 185
Furthermore, the court reasoned that even though the university rejected zero
tolerance policies concerning alcohol and sexual contacts during football
recruiting visits when they were initially proposed in 1997 after the first sexual
assaults by football players and recruits, the school was not deliberately
indifferent because its handbook included sections on date rape and
restrictions on alcohol use. 18 6 In addition, the court held that Coach Barnett's
actions, which included allegedly attempting to dissuade a female student from
reporting a sexual assault by a football player and only verbally reprimanding
a player who sexually harassed Katharine Hnida, were not deliberately
indifferent.187 The court reasoned that the
deliberate indifference standard does not require a school to devise,
adopt, and enforce the most effective possible policies once the school
becomes aware of [the] risk. Rather, the burden is on [the] plaintiff to
demonstrate that the school's failure to exercise its control over the..
relevant risk was so clearly unreasonable that the failure
demonstrates a conscious or intentional decision to permit the risk to
continue, causing the plaintiff to suffer discrimination. 188
Concerning the third element of its test, that the alleged sexual harassment
"be severe, pervasive and objectively offensive" and be "caused by the
University's deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment," the court
held that the alleged sexual assaults were "severe and objectively
offensive." 189 However, since the court had already held that Colorado had
not been deliberately indifferent, the sexual harassment could not be the result
of Colorado's deliberate indifference.
Finally, concerning the fourth and fifth elements of its test, the court held
that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the plaintiffs'
allegations.190 However, the court did not address either of these elements in
depth and only refuted Colorado's claim that the plaintiffs had failed to bring
forth any evidence to support these elements of the test. 191
After examining the entirety of the plaintiffs' allegations, the court ruled
in favor of Colorado and granted its request for summary judgment. The
185. Id. at 1242.
186. Id. at 1243.
187. Id. at 1243-44.
188. Id. at 1244.
189. Id. at 1234.
190. Id. at 1245.
191. Id.
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lion's share of the court's decision was based on its finding that Colorado did
not have actual knowledge of the risk of sexual harassment by its football
players and recruits through the recruiting program, and that even if Colorado
had knowledge of this risk, it had not been deliberately indifferent to the
potential risk of sexual harassment.
WHAT Do ATHLETIC DEPARTMENTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AFTER SIMPSON?
The Simpson case is an example of how one court has interpreted peer-on-
peer sexual harassment since the Supreme Court ruling in Davis. What can
athletic departments take from this ruling?
Most importantly, when a victim is unable to show that the school had
actual knowledge of the sexual harassment, courts will most likely find that
the university is not liable for violating Title IX. Furthermore, when a victim
is able to show that the school had actual knowledge, he or she will still fail at
holding the school liable under Title IX if he or she is unable to show that the
school was deliberately indifferent.
Actual Notice
In the context of recruited male athletes sexually assaulting female
students, no court has yet held exactly how much a school official must know
before it is willing to find that the school has actual knowledge of the risk of
sexual harassment. For example, if while attending an on-campus party, a
recruited male athlete sexually assaulted a female student who immediately
reported the alleged incident to campus security, would the university have
actual notice of sexual harassment? In this situation, the school would almost
certainly have actual notice of the sexual harassment.
However, what if the female student who was sexually assaulted waited
several days and the reported the assault to a campus counselor and not
campus security? What if the female student never reports the sexual assault,
but an assistant college football coach overhears numerous football players
talking in the locker room about how they "scored" with a girl who was so
intoxicated that she was unconscious? These latter situations are not as clear-
cut as the first situation and would probably require a court to examine the
administrative structure in each of these situations to determine if the
appropriate school officials with the power to discipline students ever actually
learned about these sexual assaults.
In addition, according to the Simpson court, a school must have actual
notice of a very specific threat or risk of sexual harassment. For example, if a
2006]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
school has actual notice that several football players have made derogatory
sexual remarks to cheerleaders at their games, this does not mean that the
school had actual notice of the risk that a basketball recruit might sexually
assault a student at an off campus party. There must be a connection between
actual notice and impending risk of sexual harassment.
Deliberate Indifference
Next, no court has held exactly what behavior constitutes "deliberate
indifference" in the context of sexual assaults on college campuses by
recruited male athletes. While the Simpson court held that a university's
conduct must be "so clearly unreasonable that [it] demonstrates a conscious or
intentional decision to permit the risk to continue, causing the plaintiff to
suffer discrimination,"' 92 it was the first court to create such a high standard.
The term deliberate indifference was first used in the context of Title IX in
Gebser when the Court held that a school could not be liable for sexual
harassment of a student by a teacher unless "an official of the school district
who at a minimum ha[d] authority to institute corrective measures . . . ha[d]
actual notice of, and [was] deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's
misconduct." 193 However, because the Court held that the school did not have
actual notice of the sexual harassment, it did not further address what conduct
would constitute deliberate indifference. 194  The Court again addressed
deliberate indifference in Davis.195 The Davis Court provided very little
additional insight into what type of behavior would or would not constitute
deliberate indifference. The Court held that the particular behavior in Davis
- failing to take any disciplinary steps against the individual who was
sexually harassing a student after repeated pleas by the harassed child and her
mother - was deliberate indifference. 196 While this does provide insight if a
similar situation would occur, it does not establish any upper or lower
boundaries for what type of reaction would or would not constitute deliberate
indifference. Deliberate indifference is a legal term created by the civil courts
and it is not found in the OCR guidelines. Because of this and the fact that
this is such a newly developed term, the OCR guidelines provide very little
assistance in helping determine the boundaries of deliberate indifference.
192. Id. at 1244.
193. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
194. See id. at 292-93.
195. See generally Davis, 526 U.S. 629.
196. Id. at 653-54.
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Future Precautions for Athletic Departments
With little guidance from the civil courts concerning the boundaries of its
potential liability under Title IX, what can athletic departments do to ensure
that they do not potentially run afoul of Title IX's prohibition on sex
discrimination and sexual harassment?
Since universities could potentially be liable for the their reaction to
sexual assaults under Title IX, they need to focus particular attention to sexual
harassment training and disciplinary systems that are in place for handling
student-athletes after any alleged sexual assaults or harassment. First, sexual
harassment training is necessary for all student-athletes, coaches, and
administrators so that all individuals are clear as to what type of behavior will
not be tolerated as well as how to notify the proper officials if this
inappropriate behavior does occur. Next, disciplinary systems need to be in
place to ensure the victims of sexual assaults that immediate and appropriate
corrective action will be taken by the school. Universities need to take
responsibility by educating athletes about the impact and dangers of sexual
assault as part of the Title IX required sexual harassment policy.
By ensuring that their athletes and coaches are properly educated about the
nature of sexual harassment as well as how to report any potential instances of
sexual harassment, a university rests easier when dealing with any potential
allegations that it violated Title IX. Furthermore, by ensuring that it has
developed an impartial and efficient disciplinary system to handle any and all
allegations of sexual discrimination, the university can be fairly confident that
it will not be held liable for violating Title IX either through an OCR
complaint or a civil action by a private individual.
CONCLUSION
Title IX was passed in 1972 in order to ensure that federally funded
institutions did not discriminate on the basis of sex. Nowhere within the text
of the statute is there any mention of athletics, sexual harassment, or sexual
assault; yet, because of the manner in which the courts have interpreted this
law, it has become an important tool in ensuring that victims of sexual
harassment and sexual assault are treated with respect and dignity. Through
the OCR administrative proceedings and the civil right of action, developed in
Cannon, Franklin, Gebser, and Davis, standards have been developed that all
federally funded institutions must comply with in handling sexual harassment
and sexual assault claims brought by their students.
In order to comply with these standards athletic departments must remain
up to date on all issues and cases involving sexual harassment and take
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measures, such as sexual harassment training and effective disciplinary
systems, to ensure further compliance. By creating effective disciplinary
systems to provide immediate and appropriate corrective action as soon as the
university finds out about any sexual harassment, colleges and universities can
ensure that they will continue to comply with Title IX's prohibitions on sexual
discrimination and thus avoid any civil liability.
Jenni E. Spies
